February 09, 2010

We recently filed our response to the court’s remittitur in the Jammie Thomas-Rasset case in Minnesota. You can read our brief here, but here are some thoughts about the case and why we are at this juncture, along with some highlights from the brief:

We have done everything within our power to resolve this case on fair terms. The defendant is someone who knowingly distributed hundreds upon hundreds of unauthorized songs without any regard for those who created them, likely bent on the brazen assumption that she’d never get caught. During both trials she lied about her actions while under oath. Ironically, Ms. Thomas-Rasset claimed during the trials what an ordeal this has been. Meanwhile, every move she and her counsel have made has been with the intent to prolong this case while refusing every reasonable settlement offer. Unfortunately, despite two jury decisions against her and a federal court’s affirmation of her liability and irresponsible behavior, Ms. Thomas-Rasset even refused a settlement offer that was less than half of the judge's remitted amount and that would have been donated to a charity for struggling musicians. In fact, Ms. Thomas-Rasset has asserted that she never intends to pay a penny to settle the case. With the benefit of free counsel, she now seeks to gut the laws that she has repeatedly and blatantly violated.

American taxpayers should not have to bankroll a publicity campaign that the defendant and her counsel apparently seek.  But if another trial is what is needed to close the book on this case once and for all, then we are left with no choice but to reject the Court's remittitur and proceed to a new trial on damages.

NOTABLE QUOTES FROM FILING:

“In its January 22, 2010 decision, the Court recognized the scope and gravity of the conduct engaged in by Defendant Jammie Thomas-Rasset by specifically noting that she willfully infringed Plaintiffs’ sound recordings, was aware that what she was doing was illegal, lied to the jury, and never accepted responsibility for her actions…”

“The seriousness of Thomas-Rasset’s conduct and its impact on Plaintiffs was not lost on the twenty-four individual members of the two juries who rendered verdicts in this matter.  They easily (and quickly) found that Thomas-Rasset had willfully infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights…”

“Plaintiffs have endeavored to pursue this case in a very reasonable manner.  Thomas-Rasset could have settled this case for a very modest amount at its inception, but she instead chose to stonewall Plaintiffs and lie to two juries. Even as recently as last week, when she could still have settled this case for a reasonable sum, she again announced that she will not pay any amount to settle the case.  Thomas-Rasset’s position is even more remarkable given that the Court’s recent order does not disturb the liability and willfulness findings of the second jury…”

“…Her conduct throughout this litigation has been patently unreasonable, and it demeans and devalues the hard-work and creativity of those responsible for the music that she felt entitled to steal and give away to countless others…”

“Unfortunately, Plaintiffs find it impossible to accept a remittitur that could be read to set a new standard for statutory damages – essentially capping those damages at three times the minimum statutory amount of $750 (or $2,250) for any ‘noncommercial individuals who illegally download and upload music.’  This far-reaching determination is contrary to the law and creates a statutory scheme that Congress did not intend or enact…”

“Neither the Copyright Act nor any case law distinguishes – as this Court did – between ‘commercial’ and ‘non-commercial’ infringers for statutory damages purposes.  Moreover, neither the Copyright Act nor any case law contains any authority for capping damages at three times minimum damages in particular cases...”

“It is not for the courts to fashion a limit on damages for any particular type of infringer or any particular type of infringement.  That job belongs exclusively to Congress…”

“When a court remits a jury award, it must have a basis for doing so and it must not substitute its judgment for that of the jury.  Otherwise, the constitutional right to a jury trial would be, at best, illusory.  Creating, as this Court did, a new and much smaller range of statutory damages and calling it ‘the maximum amount that a reasonable jury could award’ is no different than simply refusing to empanel a jury.” 

Cara Duckworth, Vice President, Communications, RIAA